

**IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LASALLE COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION**

**KATE HOFFOWER, DRU DOMINICI,
WILTON ALDERMAN, TAMMY
MCALPINE BROWN, REID COOPER,
MARK SESSA, and GARY HALL** on behalf
of themselves and all others similarly situated;

Plaintiffs;

v.

**DEMANDBASE, INC., and INSIDEVIEW
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;**

Defendants.

Case No. 2025CH000014

Judge Jason Helland

**PLAINTIFFS' UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction..... 1

II. Settlement Terms..... 1

 A. Settlement Class Definition 1

 B. Monetary Relief 2

 C. Prospective Relief..... 3

 D. Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Service Awards..... 3

 E. Notice and Claims Process..... 4

 1. Direct Notice to the Settlement Class 4

 2. Settlement Website and Toll-Free Number 4

 3. Claims, Objections, and Requests for Exclusion 5

III. The Court Should Grant Final Approval..... 5

 A. The State-Specific Classes Should be Certified for Settlement Purposes 5

 B. The Court Should Approve the Settlement 6

 1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case on the Merits Balanced Against the Relief Offered in Settlement 7

 2. The Defendant’s Ability to Pay..... 10

 3. The Complexity, Length, and Expense of Further Litigation 10

 4. The Amount of Opposition to the Settlement and the Reaction of Class Members 12

 5. The Absence of Collusion..... 12

 6. The Opinion of Competent Counsel 13

 7. The Stage of Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed..... 14

 C. Notice of the Settlement Satisfied Due Process..... 16

IV. Conclusion 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Fraley v. Batman,
638 Fed. App'x 594 (9th Cir. 2016) 10

Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. v. ACE INA Holdings, Inc.,
Nos. 07 Civ. 2898, 09 Civ. 2026, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25265 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2012)..... 7

Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of City of Milw.,
616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980)..... 14

Charvat v. Valente,
No. 12-cv-05746, 2019 WL 5576932 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2019)11

City of Chic. v. Korshak,
206 Ill. App. 3d 968 (1st Dist. 1990)..... 6, 7, 12

Fauley v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
52 N.E.3d 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) 6

Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.,
966 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 10

Frank v. Gaos,
139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) 10

Gehrich v. Chase Bank USA, N.A.,
316 F.R.D. 215 (N.D. Ill. 2016)..... 9

GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Stapleton,
236 Ill. App. 3d 486 (1st Dist. 1992)..... 6

Goldsmith v. Tech. Sols.
Co., No. 92 C 4374, 1995 WL 17009594 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 1995)11

Gowdey v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
37 Ill. App. 3d 140 (1st Dist. 1976)..... 7

Grady v. de Ville Motor Hotel, Inc.,
415 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1969)..... 9

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998)..... 9

In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Litig., 270 F.R.D. 330 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 9

In re Capital One TCPA Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 781 (N.D. Ill. 2015).....	8, 13
In re Google Buzz Priv. Litig., No. C 10-00672 JW, 2011 WL 7460099 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011)	10
In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).....	14
In re Sony SXRDRear Projection Television Class Action Litig., 2008 WL 1956267 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008).....	14
In re: Sears, Roebuck & Co. Front-loading Washer Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 06 C 7023, 2016 WL 772785 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2016).....	8
Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191 (7th Cir. 1996).....	6, 7
Kemp-DeLisser v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 15-cv-1113-VAB, 2016 WL 6542707 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2016).....	15
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, (9th Cir. 2012).....	10
Langendorf v. Irving Tr. Co., 244 Ill. App. 3d 70 (1st Dist. 1992).....	6
Pac. Fin. Serv. v. Jefferson, 259 Ill. App. 3d 914 (1st Dist. 1994).....	6
People ex rel. Wilcox v. Equity Funding Life Ins. Co., 61 Ill. 2d 303 (1975).....	6
Report and Recommendation adopted, No. 1:08-CIV-1880, 2011 WL 13266498 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2011).....	12
Snyder v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 14-cv-8461, 2019 WL 2103379 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2019).....	13
Steele v. GE Money Bank, No. 1:08-CIV-1880, 2011 WL 13266350 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011).....	12
Steinberg v. Sys. Software Assocs., 306 Ill. App. 3d 157 (1st Dist. 1999).....	6
Synfuel Techs, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006).....	8

T.K. through Leshore v. Bytedance Tech. Co., Ltd., No. 19-cv-7915, 2022 WL 888943 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2022)	11, 12
Viafara v. MCIZ Corp., No. 12-cv-7452-RLE, 2014 WL 1777438 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2014)	10
Wright v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 14 C 10457, 2016 WL 4505169 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2016).....	12
Young v. Rolling in the Dough, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-07825, 2020 WL 969616 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2020)	12
Zolkos v. Scriptfleet, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 8230, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172519 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2014)	6
Statutes	
735 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/2-801	5, 16

Plaintiffs Kate Hoffower, Dru Dominici, Wilton Alderman, Tammy McAlpine Brown, Reid Cooper, Mark Sessa, and Gary Hall (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through their undersigned counsel, respectfully submit their Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Motion”).

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 17, this Court granted preliminary approval of this Settlement between Plaintiffs and Defendants DemandBase, Inc. and InsideView Technologies, Inc. (“Defendants”). Pursuant to that Order, the Settlement Administrator with the assistance of the Parties implemented the Notice Program set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Administrator sent over 50,000 email notices, mailed over 7,500 postcard notices, and delivered nearly 50 million digital impressions. Azari Decl., ¶¶ 13, 16, 27. The Claims Period will remain open until October 30, 2025. *Id.*, ¶ 33. The deadline to request exclusion, or object to the Settlement was September 30, 2025. *Id.*, ¶ 31. No Class members objected to the Settlement, and no Class members sought exclusion. *Id.*, ¶¶ & 31. Plaintiffs now seek final approval.

In the interest of efficiency, Plaintiffs refer this Court to Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and Memorandum in Support (filed June 5, 2025) (“MPA”). The MPA, which Plaintiffs incorporate by reference, describes the factual and procedural background of this matter and attaches the proposed Settlement Agreement (“SA”).

II. SETTLEMENT TERMS

The terms of the Settlement are set forth in Exhibit 1 to the MPA and are briefly summarized here.

A. Settlement Class Definition

The Settlement defines the state-specific Settlement Classes as follows (*see* SA, §1):

Ohio Settlement Class (claims under Ohio law): All Ohio residents who are not

registered users of InsideView or DemandBase and whose InsideView “people” profile was viewed by a free user between December 2017 and February 2022.¹

Nevada Settlement Class (claims under Nevada law): All Nevada residents who are not registered users of InsideView or DemandBase and whose InsideView “people” profile was viewed by a free user between December 2017 and February 2022.

South Dakota Settlement Class (claims under South Dakota law): All South Dakota residents who are not registered users of InsideView or DemandBase and whose InsideView “people” profile was viewed by a free user between December 2019 and February 2022.

California Settlement Class (claims under California law): All California residents who are not registered users of InsideView or DemandBase and whose InsideView “people” profile was viewed by a free user between December 2019 and February 2022.

Alabama Settlement Class (claims under Alabama law): All Alabama residents who are not registered users of InsideView or DemandBase and whose InsideView “people” profile was viewed by a free user between December 2019 and February 2022.

Indiana Settlement Class (claims under Indiana law): All Indiana residents who are not registered users of InsideView or DemandBase and whose InsideView “people” profile was viewed by a free user between December 2019 and February 2022.

Illinois Settlement Class (claims under Illinois law): All Illinois residents who are not registered users of InsideView or DemandBase and whose InsideView “people” profile was viewed by a free user between December 2020 and February 2022.

Excluded from the Settlement Classes are: (1) the judge presiding over this Action, and members of his direct family; (2) the Defendants, their subsidiaries, parent companies, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parent companies have a controlling interest, and their current or former officers, directors, and employees; and (3) Settlement Class Members who submit a valid Request for Exclusion prior to the Opt-Out Deadline. *See SA*, § 1.

B. Monetary Relief

¹ The time frames in each Settlement Class account for the various statutes of limitation applicable under the relevant states’ laws.

Pursuant to the Settlement, Defendants will establish non-reversionary State-Specific Settlement Funds for each of the Settlement Classes. The amount of each Fund varies based on the size of the Settlement Class in that state, and the statutory damages available under each state's right of publicity law. The Fund sizes are: Ohio, \$1,699,830.25; Nevada, \$115,256.25; South Dakota, \$7,830.00; California, \$729,088.50; Alabama, \$325,575.00; Indiana, \$320,445.00; and \$501,975.00. SA, §1. Settlement Class Members are entitled to submit claims to their respective State-Specific Settlement Funds. *Id.*, §2.1. All Settlement Class Members who submit an Approved Claim will be entitled to a *pro rata* portion of their respective State-Specific Settlement Fund after payment of Settlement Administration Expenses, attorneys' fees and costs, and any incentive awards approved by the Court. *Id.*

Any uncashed checks or electronic payments unable to be processed within 180 days of issuance will revert to their respective State-Specific Settlement Funds. Such funds are to be distributed *pro rata* to the claiming Settlement Class Members from that State-Specific Settlement Fund, if practicable, or in a manner otherwise to be directed by the Court. *See* SA, §2.1 (e). No portion of any State-Specific Settlement Fund will revert to the Defendants. *Id.*

C. Prospective Relief

The Settlement Agreement also provides for injunctive relief. SA, § 2.2. Should they revive the product that gave rise to Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants must obscure the personal information of Settlement Class Members in any profiles that invite non-subscribers to make a purchase. *Id.*

D. Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Awards

On September 15, 2025, Class Counsel submitted a separate unopposed motion seeking attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, and Service Awards for the named Plaintiffs. Class Counsel filed this motion prior to the September 30 deadline by which Class members must object to the

Settlement or seek exclusion. The Settlement Administrator received no objections to the requested attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, and Service Awards.

E. Notice and Claims Process

1. Direct Notice to the Settlement Class

The Settlement Administrator disseminated Notice in accordance with the Settlement Agreement and this Court's Preliminary Approval Order. The Court approved Epiq Class Action & Claims Solutions, Inc. ("Epiq") as the Settlement Administrator. On July 7, 2025, Defendant's counsel provided Epiq with a data file containing 65,219 containing names, email addresses, partial posted addresses, and telephone numbers, where available, for identified Settlement Class Members. Azari Decl., ¶ 12. After deduplication and verification, Epiq identified a total of 50,610 unique Settlement Member records that contained a valid email address and/or valid physical mailing address. *Id.* Epiq sent 50,474 email notices, mailed 5,572 postcards to Settlement Class Members without a valid email address, and mailed 1,859 postcards to Settlement Class Members for whom email notice was returned undeliverable. *Id.*, ¶¶ 13 & 16. In addition, Epiq delivered nearly 50 million digital impressions via Google Display Network, Facebook, and Instagram. *Id.*, ¶¶ 26-27. The Notice Program reached approximately 90% of the identified Settlement Class Members. *Id.*, ¶ 35.

2. Settlement Website and Toll-Free Number

On July 3, 2025, Epiq established a website devoted to this Settlement ("Settlement Website").² Azari Decl., ¶ 28. Relevant documents including the Complaint, Settlement Agreement, Long Form Notice, Claim Form, and other case-related documents are posted on the Settlement Website. The Settlement Website also includes relevant dates and deadlines, answers

² Available at <https://insideviewropsettlement.com/>.

to frequently asked questions (“FAQs”), instructions for opting-out (requesting exclusion) and objecting prior to the relevant deadlines, instructions for filing a claim, contact information for the Settlement Administrator, and how to obtain additional case-related information. Settlement Class members may file a Claim Form on the Settlement Website. Epiq also established a toll-free telephone number, which allows Settlement Class Members to request a Notice Packet and/or seek assistance from a live operator during regular business hours. *Id.*, ¶ 29.

3. Claims, Objections, and Requests for Exclusion

Settlement Class Members had until September 30 to object to or request exclusion from the Settlement. Epiq received no objections and no opt-out requests. *Id.*, ¶ 31. This evidences a favorable reaction from the Settlement Classes. As of September 30, 2025, Epiq has received 846 claims. *Id.*, ¶ 33. The claims period will remain open until October 30, 2025, so this number will likely rise. *See id.*

Plaintiffs now request that this Court grant final approval of the Settlement to bring closure to this matter for Settlement Class Members and avoid the costs and delay of further litigation.

III. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT FINAL APPROVAL

A. The State-Specific Classes Should be Certified for Settlement Purposes

As part of this motion for final approval, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court certify the seven state-specific classes for settlement purposes under 735 ILCS 5/2-801 and 735 ILCS 5/2-802. This Court has already conditionally certified the classes. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the arguments they advanced in favor of certification in the MPA. The Class still meets the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and because common issues predominate and a class action is the appropriate method of litigating the controversy. Nothing has changed relative to the 735 ILCS 5/2-801 and 735 ILCS 5/2-802 factors since preliminary approval. Accordingly, that decision should be made final.

B. The Court Should Approve the Settlement

The law favors compromise and settlement of class action suits. *Langendorf v. Irving Tr. Co.*, 244 Ill. App. 3d 70, 78 (1st Dist. 1992); *Sec. Pac. Fin. Serv. v. Jefferson*, 259 Ill. App. 3d 914, 919 (1st Dist. 1994). The approval of a proposed class action settlement is a matter of discretion for the trial court. *See Fauley v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 52 N.E.3d 427, 439 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (“In Illinois, a trial court’s final approval of a class-action settlement will not be disturbed unless the trial court abused its discretion.”); *Steinberg v. Sys. Software Assocs.*, 306 Ill. App. 3d 157, 169 (1st Dist. 1999); *City of Chic. v. Korshak*, 206 Ill. App. 3d 968, 972 (1st Dist. 1990) (“A trial court’s approval of a settlement should not be overturned on appeal unless, taken as a whole, the settlement appears on its face so unfair as to preclude judicial approval.”); Newberg on Class Actions § 11.41 (4th ed. 2002) (“The compromise of complex litigation is encouraged by the courts and favored by public policy.”). In exercising this discretion, courts should give deference to the private consensual decision of the parties. *See Isby v. Bayh*, 75 F.3d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A settlement will not be rejected solely because it does not provide a complete victory to the plaintiffs.”).

In reviewing proposed settlements, courts do not “judge the legal and factual questions by the same criteria applied in a trial on the merits.” *GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Stapleton*, 236 Ill. App. 3d 486, 493 (1st Dist. 1992). The standard for class settlement approval requires that a settlement be fair, reasonable, and adequate. *People ex rel. Wilcox v. Equity Funding Life Ins. Co.*, 61 Ill. 2d 303, 317 (1975); *Korshak*, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 972. A presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness may attach to a class settlement reached in arm’s-length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel after meaningful discovery. *Zolkos v. Scriptfleet, Inc.*, No. 12 Civ. 8230, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172519, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2014) (quoting *Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. ACE INA Holdings, Inc.*, Nos. 07 Civ. 2898, 09 Civ. 2026, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25265, at *10

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2012)); *see also* *Gowdey v. Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 37 Ill. App. 3d 140, 150 (1st Dist. 1976). Courts give weight to the opinion of informed, competent counsel in assessing the Settlement’s fairness. *See, e.g., Isby v. Bayh*, 75 F.3d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court was entitled to given consideration of the opinion of competent counsel that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.”). Here, the settlement negotiations involved pre-mediation discovery, briefing submitted to the mediator, robust argument, and months of negotiations. Based on their experience in handling other class action matters, the amount of monetary recovery secured for the Settlement Class Members, and a comparison to previously approved settlements in similar right of publicity class actions, Settlement Class Counsel believe this Settlement provides fair, reasonable, and adequate relief for the Settlement Class. *See* Borrelli Decl. to MPA, ¶24.

In deciding whether to grant final approval, courts may consider several factors in evaluating whether the settlement is fair, reasonable. *Korshak*, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 972. These factors include: “(1) the strength of the case for plaintiffs on the merits, balanced against the money or other relief offered in settlement; (2) the defendant’s ability to pay; (3) the complexity, length, and expense of further litigation; (4) the amount of opposition to the settlement; (5) the presence of collusion in reaching a settlement; (6) the reaction of members of the class to the settlement; (7) the opinion of competent counsel; and (8) the stage of proceedings and the amount of discovery completed.” *Id.* Here, all eight factors support granting final approval.

1. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case on the Merits Balanced Against the Relief Offered in Settlement

There is an “overriding public interest in favor of settlement” of class actions because of the complexity, length, and uncertainty inherent to class litigation. *See In re: Sears, Roebuck &*

Co. Front-loading Washer Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 06 C 7023, 2016 WL 772785, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2016).

Here, the Parties entered into the Settlement only after both sides were fully apprised of the facts, risks, and obstacles involved with protracted litigation. *See* Borrelli Decl. to MPA, ¶19. Prior to filing suit, Settlement Class Counsel conducted extensive research regarding the Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants, and the alleged use of Settlement Class Members' names and identifies. *Id.*, ¶3. The Parties fully briefed the Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to dismiss in the *Gbeintor* action. *See* 21-cv-09470-TLT (N.D. Cal.), Dkt. Nos. 31 & 38. In preparation for mediation with Hon. Judge Ghandi (ret.), the Parties briefed the relevant issues and defenses, and Defendants produced informal discovery to Settlement Class Counsel. Borrelli Decl. to MPA, ¶¶5-11. Even after reaching an agreement on the central terms at the mediation, the Parties spent months negotiating the Settlement Agreement. *Id.*, ¶17. As such, and considering Settlement Class Counsel's prior experience in right of publicity litigation, the Parties entered settlement negotiations with a full understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, as well as the potential value of the claims. *See, e.g., In re Capital One TCPA Litig.*, 80 F. Supp. 3d 781, 793 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (granting preliminary approval to privacy class settlement where the parties exchanged discovery over several months and then mediated the case to reach a settlement).

The Settlement provides for substantial relief, especially considering the costs, risks, and delay of trial, the effectiveness of distributing relief, and the proposed attorneys' fees. "The most important factor relevant to the fairness of a class action settlement is the first one listed: the strength of the plaintiffs' case on the merits balanced against the amount offered in the settlement." *Synfuel Techs, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.*, 463 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Nevertheless, "[b]ecause the essence of settlement is compromise, courts

should not reject a settlement solely because it does not provide a complete victory to plaintiffs.” *In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Litig.*, 270 F.R.D. 330, 347 (N.D. Ill. 2010). This is in part because “the law should favor the settlement of controversies, and should not discourage settlement by subjecting a person who has compromised a claim to the hazard of having the settlement proved in a subsequent trial.” *Grady v. de Ville Motor Hotel, Inc.*, 415 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1969). It is also in part because “[s]ettlement is the offspring of compromise; the question we address is not whether the final product could be prettier, smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and free from collusion.” *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998); *see also Gehrlich v. Chase Bank USA, N.A.*, 316 F.R.D. 215, 228 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“The essential point here is that the court should not “reject[]” a settlement “solely because it does not provide a complete victory to plaintiffs,” for “the essence of settlement is compromise.”).

Here, Plaintiffs would face many challenges were litigation to proceed, some of which are discussed in Part 3 below. Further, were Plaintiffs to fail at any stage in this litigation, it is unlikely another named Plaintiff could step in to pursue Class-wide relief. The InsideView product is now defunct. Because the product no longer exists, any new Plaintiff seeking to bring suit would likely be unable to gather basic information needed to support a complaint, and may well be barred by the relevant statute of limitations.

The estimated per-person settlement payments compare favorably to prior right of publicity settlements. Net of fees and costs, Settlement Class Members in every state can expect to receive payments ranging from tens to hundreds of dollars, depending on the claims rates in each state. These amounts are in line with take-home recoveries in similar right of publicity settlements. *See, e.g. Fischer*, 19-cv-04892, dkt. 283 at 2 (calculating final take-home payments as follows: California, \$148.18; Illinois, \$745.01; Indiana, \$197.20; and Nevada, \$180.23); *Butler*, dkt. 272

(\$95 to each valid Illinois claimant); *Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.*, 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 943–44 (N.D. Cal. 2013), *aff'd sub nom Fraley v. Batman*, 638 Fed. App'x 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2016) (approving California right of publicity settlement providing \$15 to each claiming class member). And, of course, the monetary relief provided under the Settlement stands apart from other consumer privacy class actions that may provide no monetary relief. *See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc.*, 696 F.3d 811, 820–22 (9th Cir. 2012) (resolving tens of millions of claims under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act [“ECPA”] for a \$9.5 million *cy pres*-only settlement—amounting to pennies per class member—where \$10,000 in statutory damages were available per claim); *In re Google Buzz Priv. Litig.*, No. C 10-00672 JW, 2011 WL 7460099, at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (resolving tens of millions of claims, again under the ECPA, for an \$8.5 million *cy pres*-only settlement); *see also Frank v. Gaos*, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1047–48 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

2. The Defendant’s Ability to Pay

A “defendant’s ability to withstand a greater judgment, standing alone, does not suggest that the settlement is unfair.” *Viafara v. MCIZ Corp.*, No. 12-cv-7452-RLE, 2014 WL 1777438, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2014) (citation omitted). Here, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants will pay a total of \$3,700,000.00 into seven non-reversionary State-Specific Settlement Funds. SA ¶¶ 1.5, 1.8, 1.23, 1.26, 1.29, 1.35, 1.46. Although Demandbase may be able to withstand a greater judgment, the financial obligations the Settlement imposes on the Defendants are substantial. The legacy website www.insideview.com is no longer in operation and therefore no longer generates revenue for the Defendants.

3. The Complexity, Length, and Expense of Further Litigation

The value achieved through the Settlement Agreement is guaranteed, whereas the chances of prevailing on the merits are uncertain. While Plaintiffs strongly believe in the merits of their case, they also understand that should this litigation continue, Defendants will assert defenses,

continue to deny liability, and litigate this action vigorously. *See Goldsmith v. Tech. Sols. Co.*, No. 92 C 4374, 1995 WL 17009594, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 1995) (“As courts recognize, a dollar obtained in settlement today is worth more than a dollar obtained after a trial and appeals years later.”). Furthermore, the risk of obtaining no relief through continued litigation is significant. Should this litigation continue, Plaintiffs would need to prevail on a motion to dismiss; survive summary judgment; prevail at Class certification; and prevail at trial. An adverse decision at any of these potentially dispositive stages could singlehandedly doom this action and leave the Classes with nothing. *See, e.g., T.K. through Leshore v. Bytedance Tech. Co., Ltd.*, No. 19-cv-7915, 2022 WL 888943, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2022) (noting obstacle posed by adversarial class certification if litigation were to continue rather than settle). For example, the class certification decision in *Fischer v. Instant Checkmate, LLC*—an analogous right of publicity case—demonstrates the risk that class members face. No. 19-cv-04892, 2022 WL 971479 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2022). There, the court certified two classes, but declined to certify a third class of individuals appearing in search results. *Id.*, at *3, *15. While the court’s decision turned on the facts of that case, *id.* at *15, it illustrates that class status in this action would by no means be guaranteed. *See also Dancel v. Groupon, Inc.*, No. 18-cv-2027, 2019 WL 1013562, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2019), *aff’d*, 949 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2019) (denying motion to certify class because whether any given username was sufficient to identify an individual presented individual inquiries that defeated predominance).

In short, “any relief to class members would still be far down the road and may ultimately be entirely denied.” *Charvat v. Valente*, No. 12-cv-05746, 2019 WL 5576932, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2019). By contrast, “[a]pproving the proposed settlement agreement will end the case and cause benefits to flow in short order.” *Id.*; *see also Young v. Rolling in the Dough, Inc.*, No. 1:17-CV-

07825, 2020 WL 969616, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2020) (“If this case had been litigated to conclusion, all that is certain is that plaintiffs would have spent a large amount of money, time, and effort.”).

Plaintiffs firmly believe in the merits of their claims and would dispute any defenses Defendants would assert. But success at trial is not guaranteed. *See Wright v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC*, No. 14 C 10457, 2016 WL 4505169, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2016) (““In light of the potential difficulties at class certification and on the merits . . . the time and extent of protracted litigation, and the potential of recovering nothing, the relief provided to class members in the Settlement Agreement represents a reasonable compromise.”).

4. The Amount of Opposition to the Settlement and the Reaction of Class Members

The fourth and sixth factors – the amount of opposition to the Settlement and the reaction of members of the Class to the Settlement – are often considered together due to their similarity. *Korshak*, 206 Ill. App. at 973. Here, the Settlement Class Members reacted favorably. No objections or exclusions were submitted, indicating no opposition to the Settlement. Azari Decl., ¶ 31. Accordingly, these factors support granting final approval.

5. The Absence of Collusion

“A settlement reached after a supervised mediation receives a presumption of reasonableness and the absence of collusion.” 2 *McLaughlin on Class Actions*, § 6:7 (8th ed. 2011); *see also Steele v. GE Money Bank*, No. 1:08-CIV-1880, 2011 WL 13266350, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2011), *Report and Recommendation adopted*, No. 1:08-CIV-1880, 2011 WL 13266498 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2011) (“the involvement of an experienced mediator is a further protection for the class, preventing potential collusion”); *Wright*, 2016 WL 4505169, at *11 (similar); *see also T.K.*, 2022 WL 888943, at *11 (“[t]he best evidence of a truly adversarial bargaining process is the presence

of a neutral third-party mediator”) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the Settlement was reached after months of arms-length settlement negotiations, culminating in a days-long in-person mediation session with Hon. Jay Ghandi (ret.) of JAMS. Borrelli Decl., ¶¶13-16. Plaintiffs and Defendants put together detailed mediation submissions setting forth their respective views as to the strengths of Plaintiffs’ case and Defendants’ defenses, and Defendants produced pre-mediation documents. *Id.*, ¶15. At all times, the settlement negotiations were adversarial, non-collusive, and conducted at arm’s length. *Id.*, ¶¶15-16. By the end of the full-day mediation, the Parties reached an agreement in principle after extensive negotiations. *Id.* Thereafter, the Parties spent several months negotiating the central terms finalizing all settlement documents. *Id.*, ¶17.

The arm’s-length nature of these negotiations is further confirmed by the Settlement terms. Each State-Specific Settlement Fund is non-reversionary; provides meaningful cash payments to Settlement Class Members who submit a valid Claim Form; and contains no provisions that might suggest fraud or collusion, such as a “clear sailing” or “kicker” clause regarding attorneys’ fees. *See Snyder v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC*, No. 14-cv-8461, 2019 WL 2103379, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2019) (finding settlement negotiated at arm’s length where “there is no provision for reversion of unclaimed amounts, no clear sailing clause regarding attorneys’ fees, and none of the other types of settlement terms that sometimes suggest something other than an arm’s length negotiation”). Likewise, the scope of the release is not overbroad. Defendants are not getting any release that it is not paying for, the release is tied to the factual underpinnings of the lawsuit, and the product giving rise to the lawsuit is now defunct. *See SA*, § 1.38.

6. The Opinion of Competent Counsel

In a case where experienced counsel represent the class, the Court “is entitled to rely upon the judgment of the parties’ experienced counsel.” *In re Capital One TCPA Litig.*, 80 F. Supp. 3d 781, 792 (N.D. Ill. 2015); *Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of City of Milw.*, 616 F.2d 305, 315 (7th

Cir. 1980) (“Judges should not substitute their own judgment as to optimal settlement terms for the judgment of the litigants and their counsel.”). Here, Settlement Class Counsel believe the Parties’ settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and in the best interests of the members of the class. Borrelli Decl. to MPA, ¶24. Settlement Class Counsel also believe the benefits of the Parties’ settlement far outweigh the delay and considerable risk of attempting to proceed through a motion to dismiss, class certification, summary judgment, and to trial. *Id.*

This settlement proposes significant, effective Settlement Class Member relief. Cash awards will be distributed to claimants who submit valid claims forms. SA, § 2.1; *Id.*, Exs. A & B (claims forms). Settlement Class Members will have 90 days from the Notice Deadline to make a claim for a portion of the settlement by submitting their claim form either online or via U.S. Mail. *Id.*, §§ 1.9-1.10. The Settlement Administrator will have the authority to assess the validity of the claims, and upon receipt of an incomplete or unsigned Claim Form, is required to request additional information and/or documentation and give the Settlement Class Member time to cure the defect before rejecting the claim. SA, § 5.3. Accordingly, all Settlement Class Members who submit valid claims will receive their award within a reasonable amount of time. For these reasons, Settlement Class Counsel believe the Settlement is fair, efficient, and effective.

7. The Stage of Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed

The “stage of the proceedings” concerns “whether Class Plaintiffs had sufficient information on the merits of the case to enter into a settlement agreement . . . and whether the Court has sufficient information to evaluate such a settlement.” *In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig.*, 986 F. Supp. 2d 207, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Courts have found that to meet this requirement, “formal discovery need not have necessarily been undertaken yet by the parties.” *In re Sony SXRDRear Projection Television Class Action Litig.*, 2008 WL 1956267, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008). It is appropriate for Plaintiffs to enter into a

settlement after “Class Counsel [has] conducted extensive investigation into the facts, circumstances, and legal issues associated with this case[,]” particularly when the case is not one “that [is] likely to turn on facts initially in Defendant’s sole possession.” *Kemp-DeLisser v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr.*, No. 15-cv-1113-VAB, 2016 WL 6542707, at *8 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2016).

Prior to filing suit, Plaintiffs’ counsel conducted extensive investigations into facts of this case. Because this matter concerns the alleged mis-use of Class members’ names and likenesses on a publicly available website, most of the relevant facts were available and collected pre-suit. Borrelli Decl., ¶3. Plaintiffs’ counsel determined that Defendants used Class members’ names and personal information as part of a free-trial offering designed to sell subscriptions to its commercial database. *Id.*

In addition, proposed Settlement Class Counsel requested, and Defendants voluntarily provided as part of settlement negotiations, confirmatory information regarding its use of individuals’ names and personal information in the relevant states. *Id.* ¶11. Proposed Settlement Class Counsel reviewed and analyzed this information to determine the scope of necessary injunctive relief and the appropriate measure of settlement benefits to Plaintiffs and the Class. *See Id.*

Further, the Parties engaged in years of adversarial litigation before reaching resolution. *See Gbeintor v. Demandbase, Inc. et al.*, No. 3:21-cv-09470-TLT (N.D. Cal., complaint filed Dec. 7, 2021). In the *Gbeintor* action, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which the parties fully briefed. *Id.*, Dkt. Nos. 31 & 38. The Parties reached resolution only after the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in the related case *Martinez v. ZoomInfo Techs. Inc.*, No. 22-35305 (9th Cir. filed Sep. 21, 2023). The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in

Martinez resolved some of the contested issues in this action, including whether Plaintiffs' complaint was subject to dismissal under California's anti-SLAPP statute.

C. Notice of the Settlement Satisfied Due Process

This Court previously approved the Notice Plan described in the MFA and found it satisfied the requirements of due process and 735 ILCS 5/2–803. Consistent with the Notice Plan, the Settlement Administrator made use of the online database of names and contact information maintained by Defendants. The Settlement Administrator sent notice via email, along with an electronic link to the Claim Form, to more than 50,000 Class members for whom Defendants possessed an email address. The Settlement Administrator also sent notice via mail to over 7,000 home addresses. Azari Decl., ¶¶ 13 & 16. The Notice Plan reached approximately 90% of the Settlement Classes. *Id.*, ¶ 35.

This reach rate exceeds the 70% threshold recognized by the Federal Judicial Center. *See, e.g.,* Federal Judicial Center, *Judges' Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide* 1 (2010) (recognizing the effectiveness of notice that reaches between 70 and 95 percent of the class); *In re Tiktok, Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig.*, 617 F. Supp. 3d 904, 928 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (granting final approval and finding notice that “clear[ed] the Federal Judicial Center’s seventy-percent threshold” adequate). Such notice complies with the program approved by this Court in its Preliminary Approval Order, is consistent with Notice Programs approved in the Illinois, the federal Seventh Circuit, and across the United States, is considered a “high percentage,” and is within the “norm.” *See* Barbara J. Rothstein & Thomas E. Willging, *Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges*, 27 (3d ed. 2010).

Because the class notice and notice plan set forth in the Settlement Agreement satisfy the requirements of due process and provide the best notice practicable under the circumstances, the Settlement should be finally approved.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court: (1) grant final approval to the Parties' Settlement; (2) certify the seven state-specific classes for settlement purposes only; and (3) find that Notice has been conducted in accordance with the Court-approved notice plan and satisfies due process. A proposed Final Approval Order is submitted herewith.

Dated: October 7, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Samuel J. Strauss

Samuel J. Strauss

Raina C. Borrelli (*pro hac vice* anticipated)

Brittany Resch (*pro hac vice* anticipated)

STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC

One Magnificent Mile

980 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 1610

Chicago, IL 60611

Telephone: (872) 263-1100

Facsimile: (872) 263-1109

sam@straussborrelli.com

raina@straussborrelli.com

bresch@straussborrelli.com

Benjamin Osborn (*pro hac vice* pending)

LAW OFFICE OF BENJAMIN OSBORN

PLLC

Margaretville, NY 12455

Telephone: (347) 645-0464

ben@benosbornlaw.com

Michael F. Ram (*pro hac vice* pending)

MORGAN & MORGAN COMPLEX

LITIGATION GROUP

711 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 500

San Francisco, CA 94102

Telephone: (415) 358-6913

Facsimile: (415) 358-6923

mram@forthepeople.com

*Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed
Classes*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Samuel J. Strauss, hereby certify that on October 7, 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the Odyssey eFileIL system, which will send notification of such filing to counsel of record.

DATED this 7th day of October, 2025.

STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC

By: /s/ Samuel J. Strauss
Sameul J. Strauss
STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC
One Magnificent Mile
980 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 1610
Chicago, IL 60611
Telephone: (872) 263-1100
Facsimile: (872) 263-1109
sam@straussborrelli.com